This is an important question because the outcome can impact Rouhani, Iran, the region, and the international community. Yet, the unpredictable nature of international affairs makes this a difficult problem to dissect. There are, however, two considerations which may shed light on this issue: (1) Iran’s warming ties with Russia and China; and (2) the upcoming Parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections.
In the past several years, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has become thoroughly involved in all economic activity in Iran, and as a result, it has reaped vast financial benefits. Realizing that the nuclear agreement can open Iranian businesses to Western investors, and recognizing that these investors are less likely than their Russian and Chinese counterparts to engage in fraudulent financial activity, the Revolutionary Guard seeks to derail the deal. This is proving to be problematic because the Supreme Leader has endorsed the accord. To sidestep this obstacle, hardliners in the Iranian regime have started looking for new ways to obstruct the agreement.
One way to sow the seeds of doubt in Western minds is to cozy up with the Chinese and Russian militaries. In the past several months, Iran and China have made a deal in which the latter will provide 24 Chengdu J-10 fighter jets in exchange for control of Iran’s largest oil field for twenty years. Similarly, new reports indicate that Russia will now deliver its previously promised S-300 missiles to Tehran. The renewed interest in this deal comes in the midst of Iran and Russia’s new cooperation in Syria in support of Assad, as well as in Iraq.
This military modernization stems from Iran’s desire to remain a potent force in the Middle East (and not fall behind in the arms race against the Persian Gulf States). More importantly, however, it is due to some of the Iranian hardliners’ desire for better ties with Russia, many of who are Russophiles. As such, it is a win-win for them if they can improve their relations with Moscow at the cost of the moderates’ relations with the West. Should they succeed, it will be reasonable to infer that the bolstered hardliners will continue their belligerent conduct in the Middle East, and will perhaps begin to violate the terms of the nuclear agreement.
The second element that can shape the future of Iran – and in its course decide the fate of the nuclear agreement – is the upcoming elections. In February 2016 Iran will hold two simultaneous elections: one for the Assembly of Experts and the other for Parliament. Since the Assembly of Experts has the authority to choose or remove the Supreme Leader, this election is of particular importance especially considering the age of Ayatollah Khamenei (76). In light of the Rouhani administration’s recent success, the moderates are in a stronger position for both elections. Their opponents, however, are doing all they can to stop their momentum.
At this critical juncture, it is important for the United States and the West to not react harshly regardless of the belligerent rhetoric of Iranian hardliners. The Revolutionary Guard’s closer ties with China and Russia are merely short-term tactics. Given Iran’s regional isolation, its long-term strategy is much more aligned with the United States and the West. If the moderates are successful in the upcoming elections, they can continue to strengthen their position while weakening the hardliners. Rouhani will be able to improve ties with the West, potentially solve some of the region’s problems, and perhaps fulfill more of his campaign promises.