Similar to any other sovereign nation, the Islamic Republic hopes to increase its regional and global influence. As an isolated Shiite nation this means countering Saudi ideological influence and petro dollars, as well as Israeli military power. On the domestic front, this requires improving the Iranian economy and slightly accommodating the aspirations of the Iranian people.
Since 1979, in hopes of increasing its global and regional influence, Iran has portrayed itself as the last moral bastion battling the immoral “Great Satan.” Alas, having realized that Iran’s pariah status is no longer tenable or useful, the ever-pragmatic Khamenei was forced to engage with the international community. This “heroic flexibility” is due to Khamenei’s recognition that countering Saudi and Israeli influence will be impossible without America’s implicit or explicit support. The regime in Tehran understands that in spite of its rhetoric, the Iranian military is no match for Israel’s military or nuclear weapons. By agreeing to the nuclear framework, Khamenei effectively obtains the United States’ tacit promise that Israel will not attack Iran.
Saudi Arabia, Iran’s other regional adversary, has proven its unreliability and deceitfulness to the U.S. over the past several decades. The Obama administration recognizes that Iran can be more helpful than its Sunni neighbors in the fight against the Islamic State and other Islamic radicals. By agreeing to the nuclear deal, Iran improves its regional and global standing, weakens Saudi Arabia and the Islamic State among others, and in effect increases its sphere of influence.
Even by American standards, Iranian politics are complex, divisive, and chaotic. Despite Khamenei’s status as the Supreme Leader, decision-making is spread amongst various interests involved in governance. It is reasonable to infer, however, that all parties inside Iran want to improve the Iranian economy. To do so, Iran’s oil and gas exports must increase, which in turn requires the import of Western technology and investment. As a consequence of the nuclear agreement, the sanctions on Iran will be removed, and frozen assets will be freed and available to both the Iranian regime and individuals within the state.
An improving economy is particularly important since both the hardliners and reformers are competing for votes in next year’s Assembly of Experts and parliamentary pseudo-elections in a nation with an estimated 20 percent unemployment. Essentially, if foreign investments and better international relations improve the economic conditions inside Iran, both the conservatives and moderates hope to take credit for their role in reaching the nuclear agreement and use its momentum to strengthen their positions in the elections.
In examining both nations’ motivations in agreeing to the nuclear deal, it becomes evident that neither state considers resolving the nuclear issue as an end in itself. Rather, both Iran and the U.S. have their unique interests, some of which overlap. The nuclear agreement is simply a stepping-stone in achieving grander goals. It is a means to an end.