Again, I am not claiming that Khamenei will die today or tomorrow. What I am certain of, however, is that factions within the regime are well on their way in scheming and preparing for a post-Khamenei Iran. For this reason, we too should prepare – mentally, emotionally, and organizationally – so that we are not caught unprepared when the inevitable happens. Prior to the 1979 revolution, the Iranian left, the Nationalists, and various intellectual groups worked with the “mullahs” to overthrow the Shah. These same groups mistakenly believed that the “akhoonds” knew nothing of governing and would be pushed aside easily once the common enemy was gone. Due to this lack of preparation, the revolution was hijacked, and all those who underestimated the mullahs have been paying the price for over three decades.
Thus when Khamenei dies, there will be a power vacuum not previously experienced in Iran. That is why I will continue to emphasize the importance of having a contingency plan for the day when Khamenei no longer exists. I believe the best way to move forward is to explore the potential replacements for Khamenei. I see three plausible outcomes. First, another individual may directly replace Khamenei and the institution of vali-e faqih may continue unchanged. Second, the Assembly of Experts may replace a sole vali-e faqih with a council, thus adding a democratic element to the structure of the Islamic Republic. Finally, the entire institution may be abolished and an entirely new system created.
I will address the third scenario first since I believe that while it is viable, it is unlikely to come to fruition. This course of events will require mass mobilization and support from the Iranian population; it will also likely result in large protests and civil unrest. Yet, it is important to note that this scenario can become more complicated through the intervention of foreign powers, groups like the mujahedin-e khalq, or by internal separatist tendencies, some of which enjoy foreign support. Since Iranians have seemingly opted for slow and incremental change, however, it is unlikely that the population is ready to support such a vast and sweeping change with its unforeseeable consequences.
The second possibility is a single individual (most probably Mojtaba) replacing Khamenei and continuing with the current system. For this to happen, segments of Sepah, the intelligence service, Basij, and those in the extreme right must unite in their support of a single individual. Given how much those in the religious-military complex have at stake (their entire livelihood as well as their life) it is reasonable to expect that they will do all that is necessary to undermine the general will and usurp power.
The third possibility is the creation of what Rafsanjani has, on several occasions, referred to as the “council of leadership.” When Khomeini died, he was a charismatic leader who was respected by Shiites across the Muslim world and millions of ordinary Iranians. Further, the regime he left behind was unified with Rafsanjani at the helm. He was in control of the armed forces, influential in the religious community, and served as the speaker of Majlis. Accordingly, the transition of power from Khomeini to Khamenei was smooth and easy. Perhaps at the time, Rafsanjani underestimated Khamenei and believed he could turn the newly selected “Supreme Leader” into a puppet. I need not emphasize to my readers how wrong Rafsanjani’s calculations were.
Additionally, over the past three decades, the Iranian society has changed – in ideology, culture, politics, and worldview – significantly. While ordinary Iranians may have disliked the concept of vali-e faqih thirty-five years ago, contemporary Iranians mock and vehemently despise the institution. Thus, an amalgamation of a change in Rafsanjani’s vision of governance, as well as the Iranian society’s unwillingness to accept a regime controlled by a vali-e faqih, have combined to create a situation where the creation of a council of leadership is a very real possibility.
It is this scenario that provides the best opportunity for changes in the power structure as well as major reforms for the benefit of the people. These reforms, however, will be possible only if we – average citizens – support and pressure those in charge and the elite to shape the structure of the “council.” Only by actively engaging in our civic duty and holding those in charge accountable can we have any hope of shaping our future.