While Iranian politics may seem nonsensical, they are in fact extremely methodical, pragmatic, and complex. An integral component in this convoluted power structure is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, or Sepah. Many assume that because Ayatollah Khamenei has the title of the “Supreme Leader” he has absolute power. Although he is a powerful figure in Iranian politics, perhaps the most powerful single individual, the guarantor of his supremacy is Sepah. As such, if he wants to remain in power, it is vital for him to placate the Revolutionary Guard. In my view, his recent ban on negotiations with the United States was motivated by his desire to mollify the Sepah to the chagrin of the President and the moderates.
In recent years Sepah has greatly benefited from its heavy involvement in the domestic economy via connections with various charitable organizations, the oil and gas industry, telecommunication companies, a number of Iranian ports, and construction companies. It also plays a major role in Iran’s import and export market. Further, Sepah has been building ties with North Korea, China, and Russia. It works with Pyongyang to enhance Iran’s missile program, courts Russian backing in the region (within the constraints of Mr. Putin’s agenda, of course), and imports cheap and poor quality products from China. Given these lucrative connections, it is not surprising that the Revolutionary Guard wants to maintain the status quo.
Iran has the potential to be a tantalizing business partner, holding the world’s largest gas reserves and fourth largest oil reserves. Yet, because the Islamic Republic has been under international sanctions for years, the machinery and technology used to extract these reserves are outdated and desperate for outside investment. Western companies are eager to begin their commercial activity inside Iran, but Sepah, still on the United States’ sanctions list, wants a piece of the proverbial baklava.
It is here that the concept of “checks and balances” comes into play. Khamenei and Sepah understand that the Rouhani administration has gained much credit – domestically and internationally - for its efforts in reaching the nuclear agreement. They also recognize that politics in Iran can be zero-sum, and that the strengthening of the moderates means a weaker position for the hardliners. The influence of the Revolutionary Guard has already been reduced all across the region. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is not as willing as his predecessor to cooperate with and appease Tehran. Iran is losing its proxy wars against its regional Sunni neighbors in Yemen and Lebanon. And in last week, three top Iranian officers were killed in Syria. Thus, if Rouhani manages to negotiate with the West and bring a conclusion to the regional turmoil, not only will he strengthen the position of the moderates, but will do so at the cost of Sepah.
Acknowledging the importance of the Revolutionary Guard, Khamenei has loosened his grip on Sepah’s leash. By forbidding negotiations between Iran and the West on all non-nuclear matters, the Supreme Leader is seeking to limit the moderates and provide some momentum for the Revolutionary Guard. While the Iranian Majlis and Guardian Council have confirmed the nuclear deal in the last week, knowing what is at stake, its unlikely that Sepah will willingly give up any of its influence. Until now Khamenei has allowed the Rouhani administration to negotiate with the West while simultaneously paying lip service to the hardliners. It remains to be seen if he will manage to continue this balancing act or whether the next internal conflict in Iran will be between the Supreme Leader and Sepah.